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Basic Principles Underlying Duty of Loyalty
by Judge Earl R. Hoover*
Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court
WHEN THE NATION'S 25th and 47th largest banks, The Union
VTrust Co. and The Guardian Trust Co. of Cleveland,
cracked up in 1933, Ohio's Supreme Court cracked down on the
violation of an old but little known rule of fiduciary law. Two
test cases, In re Binder, 137 0. S. 26, and In re Trusteeship of
Stone, 138 0. S. 293, drew into duel more than a dozen leading
law firms. Settlement of about 500 claims awaited the outcome.
When smoke of battle lifted, the banks' liquidators had to pay
out several million dollars. The rule so expensive to violate is
the duty of undivided loyalty.
Airing of the principles underlying the rule seems warranted.
The rule necessarily is harsh, almost iron-clad. Defenses are few.
A defendant inevitably cries on the court's shoulder the same
old discredited excuses. Unless the court understands the reasons
for the rule, such tears may sway it. Because violation is so
costly, a client needs preventive advice. Because the loss may
remain on the victim unless his counsel is familiar with the rule's
reasons, counsel must know them. Importance also attaches be-
cause the rule is violated every day and it applies to all of the
many fiduciary relations.'
Because the two Cleveland test cases involved testamentary
trusts and the trustee's dealing with the trust property and not
with the beneficiaries, this examination is conducted primarily
from that angle although other situations will be called to testify.
* Common Pleas Judge Hoover holds degrees from Otterbein College and
Harvard Law School. He was Otterbein's candidate for Rhodes Scholar
and entered Harvard on a scholarship. He has been an assistant attorney
general, practiced law in Cleveland 18 years and has been judge since
1951. Public speaking and legal writing are two of his most-loved avoca-
tions. He is an honored veteran in both fields.
1 Agents, 3 C. J. S. 6 et seq.; Auctioneers, 7 C. J. S. 1259; Administrators and
Executors, 33 C. J. S. 1243; Appraisers, Armstrong v. Huston's Heirs, 8 Ohio
552; Attorneys, 7 C. J. S. 823 et seq.; Banks, 9 C. J. S. 241 et seq., 530;
Brokers, 12 C. J. S. 100 et seq.; Corporate Directors and Officers, 19 C. J. S.
161 et seq.; Guardians, 39 C. J. S. 162 et seq.; Joint Adventurers, 30 Am. Jur.
695 et seq.; Judicial Sales, 31 Am. Jur. 474; Partners, 40 Am. Jur. 221 et seq.;
Public Officers, 43 Am. Jur. 81-82, 103 et seq.; Receivers, 45 Am. Jur. 112-
113; Trustees, 54 Am. Jur. 246 et seq.
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I. Definition of Duty of Loyalty-Avoiding Conflicts of Interest-
Maintaining Disinterested Judgment.
A good starting line is the Restatement of Trusts, Sec.
170 (1):
"The trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary to ad-
minister the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiary"
Yet if you haven't bumped into a loyalty situation, you may
find it a little difficult with that definition to tell a trustee just
what he can or cannot do. For a practical understanding, it helps
to get down to cases. Listen to some:
Barker v. First National Bank, 20 F. Supp. 185, 187:
"In all his acts as trustee, he must display complete loyalty
to the interests of his cestui que trust. All personal or selfish
interests and all consideration of the interests of third parties
must be excluded. His must be an undivided loyalty."
Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Freud, 115 Md. 29, 33: "It was
said by Lord Ellenborough * * * 'no man should be allowed
to have an interest against his duty' * * * no one having
fiduciary duties to discharge should 'be allowed to enter into
any engagements in which he has, or can have, a personal
interest conflicting, or which may possibly conflict, with the
interests of those whom he is bound to protect.'"
Whichcote v. Lawrence, 3 Ves. Jr. 740, 750: "He who
undertakes to act for another in any matter, shall not in the
same matter act for himself."
Gates v. Plainfield Trust Co., 121 N. J. Eq. 460, 487: "It
is a principle universally recognized, as founded not only
on common business morality, but sound public policy, that
persons who act in a representative capacity, whether styled
executors, administrators, trustees or agents, are not per-
mitted, in the performance of their duties, to put themselves
in a position antagonistic to the interests of those whom they
represent."
Matter of Ryan, 291 N. Y. 376, 407: "Under the circum-
stances the corporate trustee had placed itself in a position
where its interest was or might be in conflict with its duty.
Either is sufficient to cause sur-charging of the trustee."
Duflord v. Nowakoski, 125 N. J. Eq. 262, 269: "The rule
which forbids those who fill fiduciary positions from making
use of them to benefit their personal interests * * * extends
to all transactions, where the individual may be brought into
conflict with his acts in his fiduciary capacity * * *. Where
the possibility of such conflict exists, there is the danger
intended to be guarded against by the absoluteness of the
rule."
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Magruder v. Drury, 235 U. S. 106, 119: "The intention is
to provide against any possible self-interest exercising an
influence which can interfere with the faithful discharge of
the duty which is owing in a fiduciary capacity."
Smith v. Tolversen, 190 Minn. 410, 413, saying that it is a
trustee's "primary duty not to allow his interest as an in-
dividual even the opportunity of conflict with his interest
as trustee."
Thurston v. Nashville & Amer. Tr. Co., 32 F. Supp. 929,
936: "these salutary rules of equity * * * guarantee * * *
that beneficiaries * * * shall at all times have the benefit
of unbiased and disinterested judgment of the trustee * * *."
Pyle v. Pyle, 122 N. Y. S. 256, 259, aff'd. 199 N. Y. 538:
"He owes an undivided duty to his beneficiary, and he must
not, under any circumstances, place himself in a position
whereby his personal interest will come in conflict with the
interest of his cestui que trust * * * . The purpose * * *
is to require a trustee to assume a position where his every
act is above suspicion and the trust estate, and it alone, can
receive, not only his best services, but his unbiased and un-
influenced judgment.
Parsons v. Wysor, 180 Va. 84, Syl. 4: "A trustee, in ac-
cepting and managing the trust property, must keep himself
in a position to form an unbiased judgment upon questions
affecting the property under his control. An unbiased judg-
ment cannot be formed and a sound discretion cannot be
exercised, within the meaning of the rule, if the trustee has
a personal interest in the transaction or represents an interest
therein adverse to the trust estate." 2
From these you gather a general running description of a
trustee's duty of loyalty as being something like this:
A trustee must administer his trust solely in the interest
of the beneficiary. He must exclude all self-interest, as well
as all consideration of the welfare of third persons. He is
prohibited from placing himself, or allowing himself to be
placed in a position where interests of his own or of others
conflict or may possibly conflict with the interest of his trust.
He cannot have an interest that is against his duty. He must
eliminate all adverse interests so he can render a disinterested
judgment in trust affairs.
To one who has read thousands of cases involving loyalty
and who has handled about 200 cases or claims involving it, the
search for a rule of thumb to detect violation, led me to ask two
2 See also 3 Bogert 1722, 1730, 1514; 2 Scott 856; 65 C. J. 652; 49 Harv. L.
Rev. 522.
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simple questions: (1) Does the trustee have a conflict of in-
terest? and (2) Can the trustee render a disinterested judgment?
The duty of loyalty aims to eradicate conflict of interest. The
existence of conflict is usually a violation. Conflict destroys an
essential ingredient without which a fiduciary relation cannot
function-disinterested judgment.
If a fiduciary's judgment is not disinterested, there is con-
flict of interest and generally a breach of loyalty. As long ago as
1838, the Ohio Supreme Court sensed this vital point when it said
(Armstrong v. Huston's Heirs, 8 Ohio 552, 554):
"Where the law creates fiduciary relations, it seeks to
prevent the abuse of confidence, by insuring the disinterest-
edness of its agents."
A century later in the Stone case, 138 0. S. 293, 302, that
court had no difficulty in getting to the nub of the rule again:
"Since a trustee is a fiduciary of the highest order and is
charged with the utmost fidelity to his trust, he must refrain
from creating situations where his own interests conflict with
those of the trust, and from doing those things which would
tend to interfere with the exercise of a wholly disinterested
and independent judgment."
Though the rule of "undivided loyalty" is ancient, it has not
been known by that particular name very long. Counsel in the
Cleveland litigation tried to pass it off as a new catch phrase
coined in 1926 by Judge Cardozo in Wendt v. Fischer, 243 N. Y.
439, 444. If Cardozo had immortalized the rule under the label
"duty of disinterested judgment," he might have rendered even
greater service in bringing it from the cloistered chamber down
to the arena where not only the practitioner but the fiduciary
could readily comprehend it.
II. Reasons for Duty of Loyalty.
The combination of three dangerous factors led courts to
impose the duty of loyalty upon a trustee: (1) the trust rela-
tion readily lends itself to secret exploitation, (2) a trustee with
a conflict of interest is bound to exploit his trust and (3) the
chance of discovering such exploitation is remote.
The Trust Relation Readily Lends Itself to Secret Exploita-
tion. The relation between trustee and beneficiary is a fiduciary
one. The duty to avoid conflicts of interest is based upon the
peculiar nature of this relation. It is not a relation of "arms
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length" between equals. Ordinary business ethics do not apply.
There is utter inequality, the trustee being superior and the
beneficiary inferior. There is great intimacy, disclosure of secrets,
entrusting of power. The trustee's strategic position places him
on the inside where he can manipulate, while the beneficiary,
being on the outside, cannot know everything that is going on.
Moreover, the beneficiary is off his guard.
Indeed the success of the relation is dependent upon the
beneficiary being freed from the necessity of being on guard or
of taking precaution step by step. What practical good would
the relation be if the beneficiary had to be present to watch every
move? Nevertheless, because of this, the relation readily lends
itself to secret exploitation. 3
A Trustee With a Conflict of Interest Is Bound to Exploit
His Trust. Not only does the trust relation readily lend itself to
secret exploitation, but a trustee with conflicting interests will
inevitably exploit his trust. No man can serve two masters with
conflicting interests.
4
In People v. Central Republic Trust Co., 20 N. E. 2d (Ill.
App.) 999, 1004-1005, the court quotes Thorp v. McCullum, 6 Ill.
614:
"Man cannot serve two masters; he will forsake the one and
cleave to the other. Between two conflicting interests, it is
easy to foresee, and all experience has shown whose interests
will be neglected and sacrificed."
This truth is grounded on the well-known weakness of human
nature. When a man's personal interest is involved, he cannot
by his very nature be fair. It is inevitable that in most cases he
will favor himself. Duty is bound to be sacrificed to self-interest.
If a fiduciary undertakes to act when he has an adverse interest,
Courts say the motive of his action must be ascribed to self-
interest and not to a sense of duty. in Estate of McLellan, 8 Cal.
2nd 49, 54, the court describes a fiduciary who has a conflict of
interest:
"His duty calls upon him to act for the best interests of
his principal; his sell-interest prompts him to make the best
3 1 Bogert; 3 Bogert 1505, 1508; 2 Pomeroy's Eq. Jur. (4th ed.) 2039; 1 Page's
Contracts (2nd ed.) Sec. 329; Ballentine's Law Dict. (1930 ed.) "Fidu-
ciary Relation"; Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N. Y. 458, 464; In re Binder, 137
0. S. 26, 37-38; 1 Lawrence's Eq. Jur. (1929 ed.) 453-454.
4 McAllister v. McAllister, 184 A. (N. J. Eq.) 723, 727; In re Harbeck's
Estate, 254 N. Y. S. 312, 320; Gates v. Plainfield Trust Co., 121 N. J. Eq.
460, 485-486, aff'd 194 A. (N. J.) 65; Piatt v. Longworth, 27 0. S. 159, 195.
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1956
CLEVELAND-MARSH.ALL LAW REVIEW
bargain for himself. Humanity is so constituted that when
conflicting interests arise the temptation is usually too great
to be overcome; and duty is sacrificed to interest."
In Loft, Inc. v. Guth, 2 A. 2d (Del. Ch) 225, 239, it is
said: "This case is but one of a line of cases which * * *
hold that when a conflict between duty and self-interest
arises in the breast of a person holding a fiduciary relation,
the only safe rule to adopt in the interest of integrity of
trust and quasi-trust relations, is the rule that ascribes to
self-interest rather than to a sense of duty the motive power
of ensuing action."
In Rowland v. Kable, 174 Va. 343, 366-367, it is said:
"One who is entrusted with the business of another cannot
be allowed to make that business an object of interest to
himself * * *. The two positions impose different obliga-
tions, and their union would at once raise a conflict between
interest and duty; and, constituted as humanity is, in the
majority of cases duty would be overborne in the struggle."
The Chance of Discovering Such Exploitation Is Remote.
Because of the inequality of the fiduciary relation, this inevitable
exploitation by a fiduciary who has a conflict of interest cannot
be discovered. I call it "indiscoverable fraud." Concealment is
easy. Hence, to allow conflicts of interest would be to assure
exploitation that cannot be discovered. Courts admit their help-
lessness to discover the inevitable fraud and exploitation that are
bound to exist in most cases when self-interest sneaks into fiduci-
ary relations. And, in most cases, it is a sneak play. However
high his standing in the community, however good his after-
thought pretensions at the trial, in most cases the trustee with
adverse interests just didn't tell the beneficiary the whole story
about his adverse interests while he was acting. Courts condemn
adverse interests in the most deadly terms saying they are
"poisonous" and that the fraud is "inaccessible to the eye of the
court." One court says nine-tenths of these frauds cannot be
detected; another says it is ninety-nine out of one hundred. Lis-
ten to the authorities:
4 Kent's Commentaries (9th ed.) 503: "The rule is
founded on the danger of imposition and the presumption of
the existence of fraud, inaccessible to the eye of the court."
Wilmington Trust Co. v. Carrow, 14 Del. Ch. 290, 294:
"In view of the difficulty of unraveling fraud in these trans-
actions, the policy of the rule is, to exclude the possibility
of it by making the prohibition absolute."
Munson v. Railroad, 103 N. Y. 59, 73-74: "The law per-
mits no one to act in such inconsistent relations * * *. It
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prevents frauds by making them as far as may be impossible,
knowing that real motives often elude the most searching
inquiry."
Clay v. Thomas, 178 Ky. 199, 204-205: "In such case the
danger of yielding to temptation is so imminent, and the
security against discovery is so great that * * * equity, at
the instance of the cestui * * * if he applies in a reasonable
time, will set aside the sale as of course."
Stewart v. R. R., 38 N. J. Law 505, 522-523: "There inter-
vened before his (the fiduciary's) eyes the opposing interest
of himself. The vice which inheres in the judgment of a
judge in his own cause, contaminates the contract; the mind
of the * * * trustee is the forum in which he and his cestui
* * * are urging their rival claims, and when his opposing
litigant (the beneficiary) appeals from the judgment there
pronounced, that judgment must fall. It matters not that the
contract seems a fair one. Fraud is too cunning and evasive
for courts to establish a rule that invites its presence. There
may be isolated cases in which the trustee is willing to make
a contract on more favorable terms for the cestui * * * than
anyone else, but the opportunity for self-advancement, at
the expense of those whose concern he has in charge, and
under circumstances where concealment is easy, are so
much more numerous than these isolated cases, that in de-
claring a rule the latter are not worthy of consideration."
Piatt v. Longworth, 27 0. S. 159, 195-196: "In such cases
the court will not suffer itself to be drawn aside from the
application of this equitable rule by any attempt on the part
of the purchasers to establish the fairness of the purchase,
because of the danger of imposition and the presumption of
fraud, inaccessible to the eye of the court * * * the sale will
be set aside, not because there is fraud, but because there
may be fraud. However innocent the purchaser in this case,
it is poisonous in its consequences."
"There may be fraud and the party unable to prove it. It
is to guard against the uncertainty and hazard of abuse, and
to remove the trustee from temptation, that the rule permits
the cestui que trust to come at his option and without show-
ing actual injury and insist on the experiment of having
another sale."
People v. Central Republic Trust Co., 20 N. E. 2d (ll. A.)
999, 1004-1005, quoting Thorp v. McCullum, 6 Ill. 614: "The
temptation of self interest is too powerful and insinuating to
be trusted * * * The temptation * * * must be removed * * *
for it would be impossible, in many cases, to ferret out the
secret knowledge of facts and advantages of the purchaser
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1956
CLEVELAND-MARSHALL LAW REVIEW
Conway v. Green's Admr., 1 Har. & J. (Md.) 151, 152:
"The chancellor earnestly wishes it understood that, in his
opinion, no rule of this court, adopted for the prevention of
fraud ought to be relaxed; but that, on the contrary, rules
against fraud ought to be as strict as possible * * *. If such
sales were allowed, there would be practiced frauds impos-
sible to be detected, as indeed are more than nine in ten of
the frauds which are perpetrated."
Lawrence's Equity Jurisprudence (1929) 577: "The
cestui is not bound to prove, nor the court to judge, that the
trustee has made a bargain advantageous to himself. Though
you may see in a particular case that he has not made ad-
vantage, it is impossible to examine sufficiently in ninety-
nine cases out of a hundred whether he has made advantage
or not."
Harrison v. Manson, 95 Va. 593, 598, quoting Lord Eldon:
"* * * the purchase is not permitted in any case, however
honest the circumstances; the general interests of justice re-
quiring it to be destroyed in every instance, as no Court is
equal to the examination and ascertainment of the truth in
much the greater number of cases." 5
III. Inflexibility of the Rule. Exploded Defenses.
The most striking feature of the rule of undivided loyalty is
the persistency with which courts refuse to recognize exceptions
to it. Disloyal trustees are persistent too-persistent in concoct-
ing new, ingenious defenses and persistent in picking off of the
rubbish heap and trying to use again a defense junked in a
hundred cases during a hundred years.
Somehow such a trustee will assume a halo complex and
insist that an exception be made for him; but courts wisely
realize that the rule must be adamant and that to allow excep-
tions to chip it away piecemeal would destroy it just as effectively
as if its entirety were shattered with one sledgehammer blow.
They therefore declare it "inflexible," "rigid," "stubborn,"
"strict," "incapable of relaxation." In emphasizing this feature,
Judge Cardozo coined another classic (Meinhard v. Salmon, 249
N. Y. 458, 464):
"Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts
of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided
loyalty by the disintegrating erosion of particular excep-
tions."
5 See also, 3 Bogert 1515-1518; 1 Story's Eq. Jur. (14th ed.) Sec. 446; Lewin
on Trusts (13th ed.) 1108; North Baltimore Bldg. Ass'n. v. Caldwell, 25 Md.
420, 424; Barrington v. Alexander, 6 0. S. 189, syl. 2; Caldwell v. Caldwell,
45 0. S. 512, 522.
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In Munson v. R. R., 103 N. Y. 59, 74, it is said:
"The value of the rule * * * lies to a great extent in its stub-
bornness and inflexibility." 6
This is readily understood. The rule is designed to cope with
a fraud that is inevitable and indiscoverable when conflicts of
interest intrude into fiduciary relations. If a door is opened
through an exception, these predatory conflicts will slip through
and work their stealthy, indiscoverable exploitation. Protection
can be achieved only by shutting all doors.
To understand the rule fully it is helpful to examine some of
the defenses that have been tested and found wanting.
Good Faith. A disloyal trustee always urges his good faith.
Almost universally the cases-hundreds of them-hold that this
is not a defense. So immaterial is good faith that courts won't
even inquire into it. In Ottawa Banking & Trust Co. v. Crookston
State Bank, 185 Minn. 22, 23-24, it is said:
"* * * the law will not permit the trustee to debate his
good faith * * *. The law will not put him to the test. It
will not inquire."
It matters not that there was good faith (In re Binder, 137
0. S. 11, 57, syl. 11; Wendt v. Fischer, 243 N. Y. 439, 443), no
bad faith (Matter of Ryan, 291 N. Y. 376, 386), innocence (Cald-
well v. Caldwell, 45 0. S. 512, 522), no bad motives (Heirs of
Massie v. Matthew's Executors, 12 Ohio 352, 354), no reason to
distrust integrity (Armstrong v. Huston's Heirs, 8 Ohio 552, 554),
bona fides (Davoue v. Fanning, 2 Johns Ch. 252, syl. 2), no actual
collusion or artifice (Barrington v. Alexander, 6 0. S. 189, 195),
honest intentions (Piatt v. Longworth, 27 0. S. 159, 201), honest
motives (Caldwell v. Caldwell, 45 0. S. 512, 522), no intention
to practice what the fiduciary considered fraud (Riddle & Parker
v. Roll, 24 0. S. 572, 579), no actual fraud (Dufford v. Nowakoski,
125 N. J. Eq. 262, 269; St. Paul Trust Co. v. Strong, 85 Minn. 1, 5;
Armstrong v. Huston's Heirs, 8 Ohio 552, 554; Matter of Ryan,
291 N. Y. 376, 405), a trustee guided solely by the interests of
the cestui uninfluenced by its own conflicting interests (Mar-
6 In re Binder, 137 0. S. 26, 47; Wendt v. Fischer, 243 N. Y. 439, 444; St.
Paul Trust Co. v. Strong, 85 Minn. 1, 5-6; Lawndale Nat. Bk. v. Kaspar Am.
St. Bk., 288 Ill. A. 555, 558; In re Peck's Will, 273 N. Y. S. 552, 556; Larson
v. Security Bank & Trust Co., 178 Minn. 209, 213; Bold v. Mid-City Trust
& Sav. Bk., 279 Ill. A. 365; In re Riordan, 216 Ia. 1138, 1143; Smith v.
Tolversen, 190 Minn. 410, 413; Conway v. Green's Admr., 1 Har. & J. (Md.)
151, 152; Wilmington Trust Co. v. Carrow, 14 Del. Ch. 290, 294; Dufford v.
Nowakoski, 125 N. J. Eq., 262, 269; People v. Central Republic Trust Co.,
20 N. E. 2d (Ill. A.) 999, 1005; 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1281.
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celus v. First Trust & Deposit Co., 291 N. Y. 372, 374), no profit
to the trustee (Barker v. First Nat. Bk., 20 F. Supp. 185, 189;
In re Bender's Estate, 192 A. (N. J. Prerog) 718, 721, aff'd. 196
A. (N. J.) 677; 49 Harv. L. Rev. 541) or no advantageous bargain
to the trustee (Barrington v. Alexander, 6 0. S. 189, 197-198; 1
Lawrence's Eq. Jur. (1929 ed.) 577).
The reason good faith is not a defense is readily understood.
We have seen that the inevitable exploitation by conflicts of
interest is "inaccessible to the eye of the court." Courts cannot
pierce the veil. In a fiduciary relation real motives are easily
covered up; the mind is impenetrable. Even if there is bad faith,
the faithless trustee can play act good faith. Bad faith, like the
exploitation itself, is "inaccessible to the eye of the court."
Even assuming that a trustee with an adverse interest does
not mean to do wrong, his judgment is so warped that he cannot
be fair, and the taking of some indiscoverable advantage is al-
most certain. No one would have doubted the good faith of Jus-
tice Holmes or Cardozo, yet no one would have cared for them
to sit on a case in which they were parties. Because they were
men of good faith, they would not have attempted it.
Fair Value. Invariably the disloyal trustee will throw up
fair value as a redoubt, but invariably the courts batter it down.
In Munson v. R. R., 103 N. Y. 59, 74, it is said:
"The law * * * does not stop to inquire whether the * * *
transaction was fair or unfair."
It is immaterial that there was fair value (Stewart v. R. R.,
38 N. J. L. 505, 523; Barrington v. Alexander, 6 0. S. 189, 198),
fair consideration (In re Binder, 137 0. S. 26, 46, syl. 7), fullness
of price (Armstrong v. Huston's Heirs, 8 Ohio 552, 554), full con-
sideration (People v. Central Republic Trust Co., 20 N. E. 2d
999, 1005), no loss (In re Binder, 137 0. S. 26, 38, 57; Matter of
Ryan, 291 N. Y. 376, 386), no damage (Wendt v. Fischer, 243 N.
Y. 438, 443), no actual injury (Barrington v. Alexander, 6 0. S.
189, 197), the best obtainable terms (Wendt v. Fischer, 243 N. Y.
439, 443) or an unobjectionable deal if it had been at arm's
length with a third person (Kinney v. Lindgren, 373 Ill. 415,
422).
Likewise the immateriality of fair price is understandable.
Fair price is not a mathematical thing like a pound in weight
or a yard in length. Fair price is usually uncertain and variable.
No two appraisers can agree. If you've been counsel in a con-
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol5/iss1/5
DUTY OF LOYALTY
demnation case you know there is always a set of expert ap-
praisers for the government and a set for the property owner,
and that they are always poles apart.
Take a piece of property roughly worth $100,000. Send 10
of the best appraisers to evaluate it. Some may be as low as
$90,000; some as high as $110,000, yet no one may be able to
say $90,000 is not fair or that $110,000 is not fair. In that instance
there is a variance of $20,000. If your trustee is buying that
property for you, he may procure it for $90,000, but if he has a
secret adverse interest, it may cost you $110,000. You may have
lost $20,000, yet no one could say the price is unfair.
Furthermore, assuming the price for that property is fair,
perhaps that particular property is not the most advantageous
one to be acquired for your trust. It is your trustee's duty not
only to pass on price, but, out of numerous available investments,
to choose which is best for your trust. If he has an adverse
interest you may miss some other more advantageous investment.
What's more, you will never be able to know or prove what you
missed.
Moreover, what may seem a fair price on the surface may
not be a fair price because of secret information that the trustee
has and that a beneficiary can never discover. If the value of an
investment declines, the disloyal trustee always cries that he
should not be judged by hindsight; while if the beneficiary only
had the means of knowing the truth, it would show that the
trustee acted with the most culpable foresight.
Besides, the beneficiary may labor under the handicap of the
adverse interest not being discovered until many years after the
act is committed, making it extremely difficult, expensive or im-
possible to establish a valuation as of a date long since past, or
to get at the real facts.
The danger to the beneficiary from conflicts of interest, and
the cestui's difficulty of proof are discussed in St. Paul Trust
Co. v. Strong, 85 Minn. 1, 8-9, where the court observes:
"And we have said nothing about the difficulty parties
would have in establishing the actual value of real estate
at the time the security was taken, when questions * * * as
to value were at issue years after the transaction."
In 3 Bogert 1516, it is said: "Equity will not inquire
into the fairness of particular sales. It realizes that, if it did,
in many cases the unfairness would be so hidden as to be
indiscoverable. The trustee might have secret information
of values which the cestui cannot prove he had."
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In Lewin on Trusts (13th ed.) 1108, it is said: "The
rule is now universal, that, however fair the transaction,
the cestui que trust is at libery to set aside the sale and take
back the property. If a trustee were permitted to buy in an
honest sale, he may buy in a case having that appearance,
but which, from the infirmity of human testimony, might be
grossly otherwise. Thus the trustee for the sale of an estate
might, by the knowledge acquired by him in that character,
have discovered a valuable gold mine under it, and locking
that up in his own breast, might enter into a contract for
the purchase by himself. In such a case if the trustee chose
to deny it, how could the court establish the fact against
the denial? The probability is that a trustee who had once
conceived such a purpose would never disclose it, and the
cestui que trust would be effectually defrauded."
Benefit to the Trust. Frequently an attempt is made to show
that the trustee's act in violation of loyalty is beneficial to the
trust. Even conceding benefit, that is not a defense. A laudable
end does not justify the use of a vicious means in obtaining it.
In Bennett v. Weber, 323 Ill. 283, a disloyal trustee urged that
his act "resulted in greater advantage to the estate" (p. 293).
The Court held (syl. 5):
"* * * end obtained by trustee cannot justify his acts. The
end or result accomplished by the trustee is not, alone, deter-
minative of the rights of the parties in a suit calling a trustee
to account, but the trustee's method of executing the trust
free from his individual interest is of the essence of the
trust."
Just as there is some good in the most dangerous criminal
or some talking point in favor of any cause however unworthy,
so in some situation a conflict of interest may afford some by-
product advantage to the trust, but that does not justify the
trustee. As pointed out conflicts of interest are "poisonous." The
pill can be no less poisonous because it is sugar-coated. The
sugar coating makes it more dangerous. The indiscoverable
fraud that stabs in the back is no less a menace because it offers
presents to the face. While it may be offering advantage in one
respect, it may be taking advantage in another. For this reason,
courts do not allow a benefit to the trust to be used as a wedge
for the intrusion of predatory conflicts into fiduciary relations.
7
7 Magruder v. Drury, 235 U. S. 106, 119 (not a defense that disloyal act
"benefited the estate"); In re Binder, 137 0. S. 26, 46 (corporate trustee
cannot buy from itself even though "it is in a position to judge most
wisely as to the value of such securities"); Munson v. R. R., 103 N. Y. 59,
74 (Court will not consider "advantages or disadvantages"); Gates v. Plain-
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It is not an answer to say that the trust estate will be a
loser if it cannot advantage itself of a benefit that may come
occasionally through the trustee's conflict of interest. One can
never know whether the conflict will give as much advantage as
it secretly takes. If the disloyal transaction is such a bargain for
the trust why is the trustee usually so clandestine about it?
Lord Eldon aptly said (Ex Parte James, 8 Ves. Jr. 337, 348):
"* * * it is better for the general interests of justice,
that in some cases a loss should be sustained by the cestui
que trust, than a rule established, which would occasion
loss in more numerous cases."
Custom and Practice. Corporate trustees particularly like
to urge custom and practice as a defense to their disloyal trans-
actions, but undivided loyalty is so deeply rooted in public policy
that the practice of violation can no more excuse it than can the
ancient practice to violate criminal laws justify violation. This
is sound. The menace of indiscoverable exploitation inhering in
conflicts of interests is no less indiscoverable or predatory be-
cause offending trustees make a practice of engaging in conflicts.
Does the practice of biased judgment make the judgment dis-
interested?
In 3 Bogert 1542, it is said: "While in practice there
has been doubtless much of this type of investment on the
part of less scrupulous financial institutions, it is believed
that it is a clear breach of trust."
In 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1281, 1282-1283, it is said: "* * *
there seems to be little doubt that banks and trust com-
panies frequently buy from themselves for their cestuis
* * * If the advantages and disadvantages of self-purchase
weighed equally in the balance, the firm policy of equity to
remove all temptation from fiduciaries should tip the scales
against the practice * * * courts have, in general, frowned
on such transactions.
In Loring's A Trustee's Handbook (1928 ed.) 34-35, foot-
note 5, it is said in discussing the rule against self-purchase:
"I am told that such is a usual practice. As the law now
stands, it is clearly a breach of trust."
field Trust Co., 121 N. J. Eq. 460, 487, aff'd 194 A. 65 (Unimportant that
cestui "may have been benefited"); Stewart v. R. R., 38 N. J. L. 505, 523
(not a defense that trustee may give "more favorable terms"); In re Lodge,
32 Ohio N. P. n. s. 40, 53, aff'd 19 Ohio Law Abstract 316, mot. to cer. den.,
8 Ohio Bar 171, Case #25,453 (not a defense "even though the value is
greater"); 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1281, 1282-83 (self-dealing by corporate trustee
a breach even though "the practice has some potential advantages");
Tracy v. Willys Corp., 45 Fed. 2d 485, 486 (counsel for receiver denied
compensation for effecting sale to himself and his group even though sale
great boon to estate).
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In Barker vs. First National Bank, 20 F. Supp. 185, 190,
it is said: "The bank has committed a breach of trust, and
the fact that the bank has pursued a course of action for
a period of years makes its action as outlined above no less
a breach of the equitable principles of trusts."
In Gates vs. Plainfield Trust Co., 121 N. J. Eq. 460, 486-
487, aff'd. 194 A. 65, the court condemned the purchasing
of securities by a corporate trustee from its subsidiary and
said: "The trust company in its assertion of good faith, and,
in support of its conduct, called a number of witnesses,
prominent in the banking world, to testify that it was a
proper practice for a bank acting as a trustee, and owning
stock in a title company, to purchase participating certificates
with trust funds from the title company in which it was
financially interested; yet, the evidence of such practice lends
no merit to its legality. While I entertain feelings of the
utmost admiration for the persons of many of those eminent
witnesses, I legally, cannot subscribe to their declared prac-
tice. Sound legal authority condemns it. As between the
choice of what appears to be the questionable practice of
banks, and a well defined policy of the law, the courts are
bound to ignore the former and adhere to the latter."
In the Stone case (138 0. S. 293), customary banking prac-
tice was one of the highlights of the defense. Trust and bank
officials from Baltimore, Pittsburgh and Cincinnati were brought
to testify about custom. The Ohio Supreme Court attached so
little importance to it that it never mentioned the point.
No Self-Dealing. In the Stone case (supra, syl. 4), for the
first time perhaps, a court of last resort held that "A corporate
trustee may not * * * retain its own shares in the trust, unless
express authorization therefor is contained in the instrument
creating the trust, or in a provision of law." The defense urged
that retention was not a deal, hence there was no self-dealing,
hence no breach of loyalty. The term "self-dealing" is used so
much in loyalty cases that counsel sometimes get a mistaken
notion that self-dealing and breach of loyalty are synonymous.
To the contrary, self-dealing is always a breach of loyalty, but a
breach of loyalty is not always self-dealing.
"Self-Dealing" is a transaction in which the person who is a
fiduciary is the acting party on both sides of the deal. Thus, if a
Trustee sells his individual property to himself as trustee, or if
as trustee he sells trust property to himself individually, he is
dealing with himself; hence the description "self-dealing." Self-
Dealing, ipso facto, violates loyalty. In In re Young, 293 N. Y. S.
97, 102-103, aff'd. 274 N. Y. 543, it is said:
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"A principle firmly fixed in equity is that a trustee may not
deal with himself. The simple fact he did is enough to in-
dicate disloyalty to the estate * * *."
However, breach of undivided loyalty is not synonymous
with or limited to self-dealing. In Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N. Y.
458, 467, Judge Cardozo says:
"Equity refuses to confine within the bounds of classified
transactions its precept of a loyalty that is undivided and
unselfish."
In In re Binder, 137 0. S. 26, 56-57, it is said: "Courts
of equity do not set bounds to the principles which control
the conduct and fix the accountability of trustees. The
elasticity of these rules extends their applicability to all
of the devices invented by unfaithful fiduciaries to evade
their obligations."
In Rowland v. Kable, 174 Va. 343, 366-367, it is said:
"One who is entrusted with the business of another cannot
be allowed to make that business an object of interest to
himself * * *. This rule is of wide application, and extends
to every variety of circumstances."
The rule forbids the trustee to place himself or allow him-
self to be placed in a position where self interest may conflict
with duty. In City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Cannon, 291 N. Y.
125, 131, 132, it is said:
"The standard of loyalty in trust relations does not per-
mit a trustee to create or occupy a position in which he
has interests to serve other than the interest of the trust
estate. Undivided loyalty is the supreme test, unlimited and
unconfined by the bounds of classified transactions * * *
The rule is designed to obliterate all divided loyalties which
may creep into a fiduciary relationship * * *."
"Conflict of interest" is the generic term. "Self-dealing" is
but one specific type of such conflict. The only reason self-dealing
is wrong is because, in self-dealing, there is conflict of interest
which prevents the fiduciary from exercising a disinterested
judgment. Necessarily, any other situation, though not self-
dealing, which involves conflicting interests and destroys dis-
interested judgment is, by the same reasoning, a wrong, full of
potential fraud "inaccessible to the eye of the court" and a
breach of loyalty.
Armstrong v. Huston's Heirs, 8 Ohio 552, demonstrates this
truth. There, the purchase by one of three appraisers at an ad-
ministrator's sale was set aside. There was conflict of interest
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but no self-dealing. The fiduciary did not deal with himself or
sell the property to himself. He was not both vendor and vendee.
He did not own the property. He was merely an appraiser.
Nevertheless the court set the transaction aside because of con-
flict of interest. The key to the decision, as well as the essence
of the duty of loyalty, is found in the court's statement that
(p. 554):
"Where the law creates fiduciary relations, it seeks to pre-
vent the abuse of confidence, by insuring the disinterested-
ness of its agents."
Similarly, in Matter of Filardo, 221 Wis. 589, 599-600,
the court said: "It is ably argued on behalf of the appellants
that Mr. Bishop, as guardian, was not dealing with himself
in purchasing the securities in question from the Iowa
County Bank; that he was merely a stockholder and officer
in the banking corporation from which the questioned se-
curities were purchased for the trust estate. True, Mr.
Bishop owned only 66 shares of the 1000 shares of capital
stock outstanding. A substantial ownership of the stock of
the bank is not the only test as to whether he, in fact, was
acting in dual capacity. His income, on account of his of-
ficial connection with the bank as its chief executive officer
may have more significance than the number of shares
owned or the actual value thereof. Upon the undisputed
facts, it must be held that Mr. Bishop had a substantial per-
sonal interest in the bank and in keeping it a going institu-
tion."
A few of the many situations that violate loyalty even though
there is no strict self-dealing are listed below: 8
8 Purchase by individual fiduciary, for the fiduciary estate, of property
owned by a corporation of which he is an officer or director. Ottawa Bank-
ing & Trust Co. v. Crookston State Bank, 185 Minn. 22. 12 Wis. L. Rev. 73;
Matter of Filardo, 221 Wis. 589. Purchase by a corporate trustee of prop-
erty from its officer or director. 49 Harv. L. Rev. 544. Purchase by corpo-
rate trustee of property from its affiliate or subsidiary. 3 Bogert 1542. 44
Harv. L. Rev. 1286; 49 Harv. L. Rev. 544, 1 Restatement, Trusts, Sec. 170,
comment "i." Agreement by trustee with a third party to exchange business.
44 Harv. L. Rev. 1286. Lease of trust property to trustee's wife. Wilmington
Trust Co. v. Carrow, 14 Del. Ch. 290. An employee's taking a lease to be-
gin on expiration of his employer's lease. Steinberg v. Steinberg, 206 N. Y.
S. 134. Acceptance by a trustee for himself from third person of any
bonus or commission for any act done by him in connection with administra-
tion of the trust. 1 Restatement, Trusts, 438. Purchase by a fiduciary for
himself from a third person of property rights which are adverse to those
of his beneficiary. Nebraska Power Co. v. Koenig, 93 Neb. 68. Renewal of
lease by one co-adventurer to exclusion of his associate. Meinhard v.
Salmon, 249 N. Y. 458. Purchase by trustee from third person of en-
cumbrance owned by latter on trust property. Strickler Estate, 328 Pa. 145,
150.
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Further citation is unnecessary. Disloyalty is not confined
to self-dealing. A fiduciary's third-person dealing or just sitting
with no-deal may also violate loyalty if he has a conflict of in-
terest.
Trust Company Trustee. Sometimes a disloyal corporate
trustee urges that the rule of loyalty shouldn't apply to it
because being a separate entity owned by shareholders and
operated for them by corporate agents, there is not the same
self-interest as in the case of the individual trustee. However,
courts apply the rule equally to the corporate trustee. (3 Bogert
1541-1542; 1 Restatement, Trusts, Sec. 170, comment "i"; 44 Harv.
L. Review 1281, 1282-1283; 49 Harv. L. Rev. 521, 543-544).
In Kelly v. First Minneapolis Trust Co., 178 Minn. 215,
218, the court said: "Though corporations, trust companies
are dominated by human nature."
In 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1282, it is said: "Corporations are
likely to be more partial to their stockholders' than to their
customer-beneficiaries' interest."
Sometimes a trust company urges that it is an advantage
to the trust to be able to buy securities from the trust company's
securities department because the company is in an excellent
position to judge its own securities and because it can let the
trust have the securities at a lower price than is current on the
street. There are several answers to this.
As we have seen, benefits to the trust cannot excuse dis-
loyalty. How can a trust company pass sound judgment on its
own securities any more than a parent can pass sound judgment
on its child? Assuming that the trust company is in a better
position to pass judgment on its own securities and to let the
trust in on a bargain, how can any one tell whether its biased
judgment is being exercised for its own or for the trust's ad-
vantage; or whether the trust is being used as a dumping
ground? (In re Binder, 137 0. S. 26, 46-47). The latter has
happened. (First Nat. Bank of St. Petersburg v. Solomon, 63 F.
2d 900). What wise man could pretend to pierce the mist and
distinguish devotion from promotion?
Technicality. In recent years disloyal trustees have par-
ticularly yelled that the rule of undivided loyalty is a mere
technicality. Thus in 1943, in In re Ryan's Will, 291 N. Y. 376,
385, the court said:
"The corporate trustee argues that we have here formerly
well-satisfied beneficiaries endeavoring to take advantage
of a technical rule * * *."
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The same contention was made in the Cleveland litigation
with equal failure. Similarly in St. Paul Trust Co. v. Strong, 85
Minn. 1, 10, the court noted without approval:
"Counsel for the company make the claim that as these in-
vestments were technically irregular only * * * it should be
exonerated."
This particular attempt at evasion goes back at least to Lord
Cairns' time. In J. C. Penney Co. v. Schulte Real Estate Co., 292
Mass. 42, 44, the court observed:
"As Lord Cairns said this rule is not a technical or arbi-
trary rule. It is founded on the highest and truest principles
of morality."
In Bennett v. Weber, 323 Ill. 283, syl. 5, it is said: "* * *
the trustee's method of executing the trust free from his
individual interest is of the essence of the trust."
Judge Cardozo referred to the rule as "the life of every
trust." (Carrier v. Carrier, 226 N. Y. 114, 126.) Further, he said
(Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Electric Co., 224 N. Y. 483,
489):
"* * * the great rule of law * * * which holds a trustee to
the duty of constant and unqualified fidelity, is not a thing
of forms or phrases."
How counsel can still urge technicality is amazing. Undi-
vided loyalty is the antithesis of technicality.
Violation of loyalty is a constructive fraud. Courts declare
it fraud even without proof of actual fraud. In In re Culhane's
Estate, 269 Mich. 68, 75, the court said:
"The law esteems it a fraud in such a trustee to take for his
own benefit, a position in which his interest will conflict with
his duty."
In Matter of Ryan, 291 N. Y. 376, 407, it is said: "The
rule is inflexible, that he shall not place himself in a position
where his interest is or may be in conflict with his duty. The
reason for the rule * * * is to bar the more effectually every
avenue of fraud. Such a purchase, though it may not origi-
nate in any purpose to defraud, is a constructive fraud." 8a
Sa Armstrong v. Huston's Heirs, 8 Ohio 552, syl. (purchase by appraiser set
aside "as infected with fraud"); 3 C. J. S. 7 (violations of loyalty "con-
sidered in light of frauds"); Michoud v. Girod, 45 U. S. 503, syl. 2 (pur-
chase of fiduciary property by trustee or agent "carries fraud on the face
of it"); Joliet Trust & Savings Bank v. Ingalls, 276 Ill. A. 445, 452 (trustee
purchasing securities from itself, a "fraud upon the estate"); Leaphart v.
Nat. Surety Co., 167 S. C. 327, 336 (investment of ward's money in fiduci-
ary's own property, a "fraud").
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How can a rule designed to cope with fraud be technical?
Courts declare conflicts of interest "poisonous." Since when is
poison so harmless that safety rules are mere technicalities?
Courts declare conflicts of interest against public policy. In
25 C.J. 1120, it is said:
"It is against public policy to allow persons occupying fidu-
ciary relations to be placed in positions in which there will
be constant danger of a betrayal of trust by the vigorous
operation of self motives."
(Ulmer v. Fulton, 129 0. S. 323, 336; Gates v. Plainfield Trust
Co., 121 N. J. Eq. 460, 487, aff'd 194 A. 65; Estate of McLellan,
8 Cal. 2d 49, 54; 3 C. J. S. 7.)
How can a rule designed to eradicate a menace to public
policy be technical?
Courts declare that good faith, fair value and a benefit to
the trust are not defenses to divided loyalty. Wouldn't it seem,
therefore, that the thing attempted to be stamped out is funda-
mentally vicious?
Negligence. Frequently, too, the disloyal trustee urges that
he was not negligent. He might just as well aver that it was a
pleasant day when the transaction occurred. Negligence and
violation of loyalty are two entirely different concepts. One has
to do with lack of due care, the other with conflicts of interest.
The fact that "many outstanding, successful and conservative
business men" in the community approved such type transaction,9
or that there was a custom or practice to do such a thing or
that the particular investment if bought from a third person
would be proper1 ° does not exonerate divided loyalty. In Smith
v. Tolversen, 190 Minn. 410, 413, the court said:
"Defendant is charged primarily, not because of what he
bought or sold, but because, as trustee, he bought from or
sold to himself, or tried to. * * * his liability follows, not
because of the character of the things he purchased or sold,
but because the manner of purchase or sale was a violation
of his primary duty not to allow his interest as an individual
even the opportunity of conflict with his interest as trustee."
In Grodsky v. Sipe, 30 F. Supp. 656, 661, it is said: "* * *
he (the trustee) is not given the same freedom of choice
that may be exercised by prudent business men in their own
affairs but is held to a higher standard of duty * * *. He is
forbidden to deal with trust property for his own advantage."
9 Thurston v. Nashville Trust Co., 32 F. Supp. 929, 937.
10 Restatement, Trusts 560; 49 Harv. L. Rev. 539; Barker v. First Na-
tional Bank, 20 F. Supp. 185, 188; Bold v. Mid-City Tr. & Say. Bk., 279
Ill. A. 365, syl.
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In Thurston v. Nashville & Amer. Trust Co., 32 F. Supp.
929, 936, it is said: "* * * a court does not stop to inquire
* * * whether it was prudent * * *. Neither a showing of
good faith nor prudence can make permissible such a trans-
action * * *."
Testator-Settlor a Stockholder and Director and Knew Prac-
tices. In Gates v. Plainfield Trust Co., 121 N. J. Eq. 460, aff'd.
194 A. 65, complaint was made because a corporate trustee
purchased securities from its subsidiary. The testator-settlor
had been director of the trustee company about six years before
his death, during which time, to the testator's knowledge, it
purchased the same type of securities for its trusts from the
subsidiary. The court disapproved the investment as disloyalty,
saying with reference to the testator's connection with the trustee
and his knowledge of these practices (pp. 483-484):
"But such array of facts * * * cannot warrant the conclusion
that the trust company was justified in departing from its
plain duty to cling strictly to legal investments. The testa-
tor, despite his activities as a director of the trust company,
his evident knowledge of its interest in the mortgage com-
pany (the subsidiary), and his acquaintance with the pur-
chases by the trust company of mortgage certificates from
the mortgage company, did not, in his will, or codicil, au-
thorize the purchase of such certificates. While, in life, he,
as director of the trust company, sanctioned certain prac-
tices, still his testament conveys no mandate to his repre-
sentatives to pursue the same rule of conduct."
In Lawndale Nat. Bank v. Kaspar Amer. State Bank, 288
Ill. A. 555, the defendant bank had been both executor and
trustee of an estate. The court disapproved the sale of the de-
fendant's individual property to the estate although the testator
had been a director and stockholder of a predecessor bank that
had been consolidated into the defendant bank.
In Kinney v. Lindgren, 373 Ill. 415, a suit to require payment
to trust beneficiaries of money invested by trustees in bonds of
a trust company of which the trustees were officers, it was held
(syl. 4 and pp. 421-422) that evidence that the settlor had placed
bonds (which she had purchased from a predecessor of the trust
company) in the hands of officers of the trust company, in trust
for the settlor and her daughter, was insufficient to establish that
the trustees were authorized to purchase bonds for the trust
from the trust company; and that evidence that before the trust
agreement was signed, the settlor, who died before the bonds
were purchased, informed the attorney for the trust company's
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predecessor that the settlor wished the predecessor to be trustee
so that it could buy bonds for the trust of the type dealt in by
that company, and that the attorney informed the settlor that the
same result could be obtained by appointment of the individual
trustees, was inadmissible.
This position is sound. Even though most intimately con-
nected with a trust company during his life, a testator cannot
know what is going to happen when he is no longer there to
watch what is going on. The possibility of indiscoverable fraud
inhering in all conflicts of interest, lives though he dies.
This holding is in keeping with the two points next dis-
cussed: Even though the settlor makes (1) a relative or (2)
himself the trustee, that does not imply the right to violate
loyalty.
Trustee, A Relative. When a settlor makes a relative the
trustee-with all the trust that blood and marriage imply-he
certainly gives management to one in whom he has the greatest
confidence, greater ordinarily than in case of a stranger. Yet
courts do not even consider relationship strong enough to over-
come temptation and probability of abuse when conflicts of
interest enter the family circle. There is no implication from
relationship that the settlor meant to free the trustee from the
prohibition against conflicts. Accordingly, the prohibition ap-
plies to a relative the same as to a stranger.'
Trustee, The Settlor. Even when a settlor appoints himself
the fiduciary, and the trust instrument gives him "absolute and
uncontrolled" power over investments, he cannot violate loyalty.
12
If, from the confidence and knowledge a settlor has in and of
himself, it cannot be implied that he waives the rule against
self-interest as to himself, certainly it cannot be implied from
his confidence and knowledge regarding a trust company that
he waives the rule against self-interest as to it. To contend other-
wise, one may as well argue that because a testator (or his
trusted agent at his direction) drilled his money into paper gold
mines or freely exchanged it for chips at Monte Carlo, his trustee
could go and do likewise. Assume too that that agent later be-
came his testamentary trustee and thus knew that the testator
11 Gould v. Gould, 213 N. Y. S. 286-trustees, children of settlor; McAllister
v. McAllister, 184 A. (N. J. Eq.) 723-trustees, settlor's son and son-in-law;
Matter of Petrie, 5 Dem. Sur. (N. Y.) 352-trustees, settlor's sons; Murphy-
Bolanz Land & Loan Co., 236 S. W. 2d 78-one co-trustee, relative by mar-
riage.
12 Carrier v. Carrier, 226 N. Y. 114, 125, 126; 49 Harv. L. Rev. 521, 546.
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had had no hesitancy investing his money in shafts or roulette.
Is it not obvious that a new, distinct code becomes protector
when death or living signature gives property to fiducial care?
Complex Business Age. In the Cleveland litigation it was
intimated that undivided loyalty was a bit horse and buggy, a
relic from days when trustees were individuals and a single
trustee's trusts, few-whereas now a corporate trustee might
be a stable for 5000 trusts investing $20,000,000 in one revolution
of the sun around the ecliptic.13.
We live in a modern world with modern business conditions
but we are confronted with a human nature that has changed
little during the centuries. It is the same human nature domi-
nated by the same self-interest. The complicated innovations
condemned in the Cleveland litigation were creatures of the
Twentieth Century. The duty of loyalty is a simple rule that
stands guard over fiduciary relations, however complex the
modern device that attempts to cross its threshold. Through
that door, modernity and complexity cannot pass if they do not
respect loyalty. In Nebraska Power Co. v. Koenig, 93 Neb. 68,
76-77, in discussing loyalty, the court said:
"The philosophy on which these rules of law and equity rest
come down through the centuries from the Chancellor of
Galilee. The wisdom and necessity of such doctrines become
more apparent as the forms in which property is held multi-
ply under new conditions, and as earning capital in control
of agents or trustees follow new enterprises over the world,
where it is not under the watchful eye of the owner. Courts
of equity do not set bounds to the principles which control
the conduct and fix the accountability of trustees. The elas-
ticity of these rules extends their applicability to all of the
devices invented by unfaithful fiduciaries to evade their ob-
ligations or to defeat the imperative demands of business
integrity and sound public policy."
(In re Binder, 137 0. S. 26, 56.)
Difficulty of Procuring Satisfactory Investments. It did not
appear in the Supreme Court's opinion, but in the Cleveland
litigation counsel failed to revive a very dead defense when they
urged-"desirable trust investments were not easy to obtain."
Long ago in In re Long Island Loan & Trust Co., 87 N. Y. S. 65
aff'd, 179 N. Y. 520, the court disapproved a corporate trustee's
sale of its own property to its trust although an executive com-
mittee resolution explained that it was "in consequence of the
13 In re Binder, 137 0. S. 26, 34.
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difficulty of procuring satisfactory" investments. This conclusion
is reasonable. Indiscoverable fraud that exploits a trust when
self-interest competes with duty, can gouge as easily when good
investments are difficult to procure as when they are not difficult
to procure. The difficulty makes fraud no less "inaccessible to
the eye of the court."
Depression. Since 1929 it has been fashionable for disloyal
trustees to pass the buck on to the depression, blaming it for all
losses, saying that every one, even the wisest investor, lost his
shirt, so that if, in a disloyal investment, the trust lost its shirt, it
didn't lose anything that it wouldn't have lost anyway. The Ohio
Supreme Court couldn't see that argument saying (In re: Binder,
137 0. S. 26, 57):
"* * * the right * * * to rescind does not depend on whether
the trust estate has suffered a loss * * * he (the trustee)
may be surcharged with any decline in value * * * notwith-
standing there may be no causal relation between his self-
dealing and the loss or depreciation incurred."
The New York Court, too, flayed the depression argument (Mat-
ter of Ryan, 291 N. Y. 376, 385):
"The corporate trustee argues that we have here 'formerly
well-satisfied beneficiaries endeavoring to take advantage of
a technical rule against self-purchase' of securities and that
their objections are after thoughts due to the real estate
collapse in the years succeeding 1929. Whether or not the
beneficiaries are thus motivated is irrelevant * * * Even
though over a long period breaches of those rules have not
resulted in loss * * * the rules continue to operate as a
protection * * * and beneficiaries * * * may point to those
rules and insist that the trustee be surcharged when loss
* * * eventually ensues by reason of the breaches."
How could a court hold otherwise? Before the depression a
court could set aside a disloyal investment because infected with
exploitation and fraud "inaccessible to the eye of the court."
Now the depression arrives. How does the depression automati-
cally extract the exploitation and fraud or render them acces-
sible to the court's eye? If a court cannot put its eye on the in-
evitable exploitation and fraud, how can it gauge the life blood
that parasitic self-interest has sucked from the investment ren-
dering it easier prey to depression?
Of course, most complaints against disloyalty don't come
until an investment has depreciated. Why? Because there's a
fiduciary relation. The trustee is trusted. The beneficiary does
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not eavesdrop on every thought, or shadow every move of the
trustee. He is not required to distrust the trustee. The relation
would be useless if he were. Consequently the beneficiary
doesn't automatically know it when his trustee violates loyalty.
Usually the trustee will take pains to see that he does not learn
of it. Not until the investment depreciates does the beneficiary
become alarmed into making investigation that may uncover the
conflict of interest.
The trustee who risks disloyalty knows the likelihood of
economic change and uncertain future values. When caught,
isn't it a little absurd if he can tell the beneficiary-"The eco-
nomic cycle determines whether you have a right of redress.
The cycle is now in my favor. A depression has intervened."
There cannot be one set of rules for periods of prosperity and
another for periods of depression.
Insolvency of the Trustee. In the Cleveland litigation, the
corporate trustees were insolvent. Liquidators thought that that
should be a defense, urging that to allow trusts to establish claims
would penalize depositors and creditors. Further it was urged
that the ban against disloyalty was but a technical rule to take
temptation away from the trustee, and now that the trustee was
dead there was no need to worry about tempting it. The Supreme
Court rejected these contentions (In re Binder, 137 0. S. 26,
57-58).
Of course it would gratify any creditor if all other types of
creditors were excluded from the liquidation pile. By the same
reasoning, it hurts a trust creditor if depositors are allowed to
share. Moreover, there is something more basic to undivided
loyalty than curbing the trustee's prospective temptations. To
expose the fiduciary relation to conflicts of interest means in-
discoverable abuse. Assuredly, beneficiaries must be protected
from future abuse. But, to have exposed fiduciary relations to
conflicts means that indiscoverable abuse has already been busy.
No less must the beneficiary have redress for past abuse. There
cannot be one law for the past and another for the future; one
law for the beneficiary who has suffered abuse and another for
the one who will suffer. Courts do allow redress though the
trustee is insolvent. 14
14 In re Trusteeship of Stone, 138 0. S. 293; Baxter v. Union Industrial
Trust & Savings Bank, 273 Mich. 642; Joliet Trust & Savings Bank v.
Ingalls, 276 Ill. A. 445; Lawndale Nat. Bk. v. Kaspar Amer. St. Bk., 288
Ill. A. 555; People, etc. v. Canton Nat. Bk., 288 Ill. A. 418.
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Acquiescence, Waiver, Estoppel, Ratification, Release. In any
disloyalty trial you can bet on one or more of those at the defense
table. If the disloyal trustee has sold his own property to the
trust, his story usually goes like this:
"This beneficiary knew at all times that I bought this very
X Bond for the trust. I sent him a written statement showing
it. He knowingly accepted the income from this bond. He
approved its purchase. He even gave me a written release."
All that does not exonerate the trustee. Two essentials are
absent: (1) he did not disclose that he bought the bonds from
himself and (2) he did not tell the beneficiary what his legal
rights were.
The disloyal trustee usually has an idea that he is pulling
something. He parts with just enough information so he can
argue his respectability if caught, but he hesitates to risk killing
the deal by disclosing everything. Recognizing this, courts say
that the trustee must make a full disclosure of all the facts in-
cluding the fact of his self-interest. In St. Paul Trust Co. v.
Strong, 85 Minn. 1, 11, the court said:
"Imperfect and incomplete information is insufficient * *
Judge Cardozo said:
"If dual interests are to be served, the disclosure to be effec-
tive must lay bare the truth, without ambiguity or reserva-
tion, in all its stark significance." (Wendt v. Fischer, 243
N. Y. 439, 443).
However, full disclosure of facts alone will not exonerate
the trustee. Knowing that the average beneficiary is ignorant
of his legal rights even when he knows the facts, courts go one
step further and say that the trustee must tell the beneficiary
what his legal rights are under those facts. The trustee must tell
the beneficiary that what the trustee did is a breach for which
the court will give redress. A trustee who procures a written
approval or release from a beneficiary without disclosing all
facts and explaining the latter's legal rights is wasting his ink.
The burden of proving full disclosure of facts and explanation
of legal rights is on the trustee; and proof must be full and
satisfactory. 15
15 Matter of Ryan, 291 N. Y. 376, 417, syl. 13; In re Trusteeship of Stone,
138 0. S. 293, 305; St. Paul Trust Co. v. Strong, 85 Minn. 1, 10-11; Hodge
v. Mackintosh, 248 Mass. 181, 187; In re Long Island Loan & Trust Co.,
87 N. Y. S. 65, 67, aff'd. 179 N. Y. 520; McAllister v. McAllister, 184 A. (N. J.
Eq.) 723, 727-729; Kinney v. Lindgren, 373 Ill. 415, 422; In re Bender's
Estate, 192 A. 718, 722-723 (N. J. Prerog.), aff'd 196 A. 677; Baxter v. Union
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In concluding this point it is well to remember this warning
(Caldwell v. Caldwell, 45 0. S. 512, 523):
"There are considerations of public policy requiring the ut-
most fidelity and a rigid compliance with all his fiduciary
obligations which forbid this court prosecuting a diligent
search for grounds of estoppel, acquiescence, waiver or ex-
cuse, for the purpose of relieving such a trustee from the
uncompromising discharge of his trust."
Other Excuses. Disregard for loyalty is not excused because
the trust instrument waives the ordinary rules as to investments
and gives the trustee the widest possible discretion,1O or the
disloyal trustee is but one of a number of co-trustees, 17 or there
is sympathy for an already overburdened and distressed com-
munity,18 or those in charge of the trust company are men of
standing in the community, 19 or the profit made by the trustee
is no more than the services are reasonably worth, 20 or the invest-
ment complies with the statutory requirements, is perfectly se-
cured and bears the highest rate of interest, 21 or there is no
causal relation between the disloyalty and the loss.22 These are
by no means exhaustive; they are but illustrative.
IV. Some Procedural Aspects.
The duty of undivided loyalty is a rule of substantive law,
City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Cannon, 35 N. Y. S. 2d 870,
syl. 1, but it has procedural aspects that are well to remember,
namely:
Industrial Trust & Savings Bank, 273 Mich. 642, 648; In re Riordan, 216Ia. 1138; Marchant v. Wannamaker, 176 S. C. 369; Smith v. Hawlett, 51N. Y. S. 910, syl. 2; In re Peck's Will, 273 N. Y. S. 552, syl. 3; In re Young's
Estate, 293 N. Y. S. 97, 104, aff'd 274 N. Y. 543; Gates v. Plainfield TrustCo., 121 N. J. Eq. 460, 488, aff'd 194 A. 65; Smith v. Tolversen, 190 Minn.410, 414; Joliet Trust & Savings Bank v. Ingalls, 276 Ill. A. 445, 453-454;Lawndale Nat. Bk. v. Kaspar Amer. St. Bk., 288 Ill. A. 555, 565; Murphy-Bolanz Land & Trust Co. v. McKibben, 236 S. W. 78; First Nat. Bank v.
Solomon, 63 F. 2d 900.
16 In re Binder, 137 0. S. 26, 43-44, syl. 10; In re Trusteeship of Stone,
138 0. S. 293, 305; Carrier v. Carrier, 226 N. Y. 114, 119, 125-126; In reHarbeck's Estate, 254 N. Y. S. 312, 314; In re Peck's Will, 273 N. Y. S. 552,554; Barker v. First Nat. Bank, 20 F. Supp. 185, 186.
17 Tracy v. Central Trust Co., 192 A. (Pa.) 869, 870.
'8 In re Culhane's Estate, 269 Mich. 68, 77.
19 Matter of Ryan, 291 N. Y. 376, 386.
20 Magruder v. Drury, 235 U. S. 106, 120; Bold v. Mid-City Trust & Say.
Bk., 276 Ill. A. 365, 369.
21 Bold v. Mid-City Trust & Say. Bk., 279 Ill. A. 365, 371, 374.
22 In re Binder, 137 0. S. 26, 57.
26https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol5/iss1/5
DUTY OF LOYALTY
1. The burden is on the trustee to prove that he complied
with his duty of loyalty. (Malcolmson v. Goodhue County
Nat. Bk., 198 Minn. 562, 567; Smith v. Tolversen, 190 Minn.
410, 414.)
2. All ambiguities in the trustee's records and all doubts
are resolved against the trustee (Malcolmson v. Goodhue
County Nat. Bk., 198 Minn. 562, 567).
3. In determining whether a trustee has breached his
loyalty as to a particular investment, the fact that he has
breached it as to other investments may be significant (Mal-
colmson v. Goodhue County Nat. Bk., 198 Minn. 562, 568-
569).
4. A statute that modifies the rule of loyalty is in dero-
gation of the common law and must be strictly construed
against the trustee (Matter of Ryan, 291 N. Y. 376, 400).
5. In accepting a trust the trustee is presumed to know
his duties including that of loyalty. (In re Trusteeship of
Stone, 138 0. S. 293, 302-303).
6. The burden of proving acquiescence, estoppel, ratifi-
cation, waiver or release is on the trustee. The trustee must
prove by "full and satisfactory" evidence that all the facts
were disclosed to the beneficiary and that the beneficiary
was apprised of his legal rights.
V. Conclusion.
The trust relation is a fiduciary relation. It is a relation of
inequality, readily lending itself to secret exploitation of the
beneficiary by the trustee. Human nature is such that a person
cannot fairly serve two masters with conflicting interests espe-
cially when one master is himself. In such conflict the danger
of fraud and exploitation is so certain, and the ability of a
beneficiary or Court to discover and prove them is so remote,
that only prohibition of adverse interests can secure protection.
In Armstrong v. Huston's Heirs, 8 Ohio 552, 554, it is said:
"The temptation to abuse power for selfish purposes is so
great that nothing less than that incapacity is effectual, and
thus a disqualification is wrought by the mere necessity of
the case."
Judge Cardozo said (Wendt v. Fischer, 243 N. Y. 439, 443-444):
"The law does not stop to inquire whether the contract or
transaction was fair or unfair. It stops the inquiry when
the relation is disclosed, and sets aside the transaction or
refuses to enforce it, at the instance of the party whom the
fiduciary undertook to represent, without undertaking to
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deal with the question of abstract justice in the particular
case."
In concluding, it may be well to relieve the mind of the
trustee who is always sure that the strict application of undi-
vided loyalty is going to impede or ruin the trust business. In
Ottawa Banking & Trust Co. v. Crookston State Bank, 185 Minn.
22, 23-24, the Court aptly warns the Trustee:
"The mere statement that the law does not permit a trustee
as an individual to deal with himself as trustee should be
enough. Slight reflection ought to persuade a trustee that
if as trustee he can trade with himself as an individual his
usefulness as a trustee is gone; and with it will go the op-
portunity of acting as such among those who understand
that he has such power; for if he has such power no one
will want him long as trustee."
(Matter of Filardo, 221 Wis. 589, 599.)
In Matter of Ryan, 291 N. Y. 376, 385, the Court so truly says
of the loyalty rules:
"The common law rules * * * are of very long standing.
Within those rules there is ample room for the exercise by
trustees of wise judgment and discretion."
It is inspiring the way a trustee can buckle down after a dis-
loyalty trial and do, or do without, the things that, at the trial, he
was sure couldn't be done or done without. These splendid post-
trial performances prove the statement in Farmers' & Merchants'
Bank of Los Angeles v. Downey, 53 Cal. 466, 468-469:
"* * * as observed by the Court of Appeals of the State of
New York, in Bow v. Bow, 56 N. Y. 288, 'when agents and
others, acting in a fiduciary capacity, understand that these
rules will be rigidly enforced, even without proof of actual
fraud, the honest will keep clear of all dealings falling within
their prohibition, and those dishonestly inclined will con-
clude that it is useless to exercise their wits in contrivances
to evade it'."
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